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MAJOR COURT DECISIONS OF 1996
The following is a compendium of major com-
munications law decisions handed down by courts
of the United States in 1996.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ISSUES
DeLorme Publishing Co., Inc. v. National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
of the U.S. Department of Commerce
917 F. Supp. 867 (D.Me. 1996)
Issue:
Whether or not there is an exception to the re-
quirements under the Freedom of Information
Act ("FOIA") for documents, in this case, Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
("NOAA") electronic raster compilations of nauti-
cal charts, when such government documents are
created in cooperation with, and in anticipation
of and during, a cooperative research and devel-
opment agreement ("CRADA"), entered into with
a private business.
Holding:
The court held that NOAA's raster compila-
tions, when created in anticipation of entering
into a CRADA, were protected from disclosure for
up to five years under the Federal Technology
Transfer Act ("FTTA"); that said compilations
were not subject to mandatory and permanent
protection under FTTA; that any electronic com-
pilations created after NOAA entered into the
CRADA were subject to a five year protection; and
that, under FOIA, NOAA did not improperly with-
hold said compilations from plaintiff; while said
compilations could not be protected indefinitely
under FOIA from disclosure, as they were not
records related solely to internal personnel rules
and practices of NOAA.
Discussion:
The court looked at FOIA, and the various ex-
emptions therein, and found that the court would
defer to the administrative agency's interpreta-
tions depending upon the extent to which the
matters in issue depend particularly upon the sub-
ject agency's area of expertise. The court further
reviewed the FTTA's statement of purpose and
found that it was enacted to improve the interac-
tion and competitiveness of the government and
private parties, and to create "'a broad range of
cooperative research and development arrange-
ments . . . between the laboratory mission
and . . . private sector organizations."' Id. at S.
REP. No. 283, 99th Cong., 1, 10 (1986). As a re-
sult, the court discussed the fact that there were
two types of protection available to prevent other-
wise mandatory disclosure of commercial infor-
mation. First, is information that is obtained
through the conduct of research from a non-Fed-
eral party participating in a CRADA; and the sec-
ond, is a five year protection afforded agencies if
the information in question is resultant from re-
search and development activities and would be
information that would be privileged or confiden-
tial if obtained from a non-Federal party partici-
pating in a CRADA. The resulting rule found that
commercial information is 'confidential' for pur-
poses of the exemption if disclosure of such infor-
mation would likely either, (1) impair the Govern-
ment's ability to obtain necessary information at a
future point in time; or (2) cause substantial
harm to the competitive position of the entity
form which such information was obtained.
McCaw Communications, Inc. v. Clark
679 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 1996)
Issue:
Whether the Florida Commission's revisiting of
the regulation of interconnection rates, which re-
sulted in an order severing the link between inter-
connection rates and access charges, violated the
doctrine of administrative finality and was sup-
ported by sufficient evidence.
Holding:
The re-evaluation of interconnection rates was
affirmed by the court as valid and supported by
ample evidence.
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ANTITRUST ISSUES
The court concluded that extensive evidence
existed to support the Commission's decision. In
regard to administrative finality, the court held
that this type of issue was one that must be contin-
ually re-evaluated, based on shifting circum-
stances and the passage of time.
United States v. Western Electric
Company, Inc.
2 Comm. Reg. (P&F) 1388 (1996)
Issue:
Whether the regional Bell operating companies
(RBOCs) should be granted a court order to re-
quire the return of numerous documents ob-
tained by the DOJ rather than allow the docu-
ments to be transferred for use by the FCC in
proceedings authorized by Congress.
Holding:
The court denied the RBOCs request for return
of the documents since requiring the FCC to col-
lect documents as authorized by Congress which
are already held by the DOJ would simply be du-
plicative and would "make no sense."
Discussion:
The court rested its holding on the fact that
Congress through the Telecommunications Act of
1996 implicitly believed that the FCC with its
newly-acquired quasi-judicial role would receive
the DOJ's full cooperation, which included access
to information needed by the FCC to carry out its
new responsibilities. The court held that the FCC
may obtain from the DOJ and use the documents
needed to implement Section 271 or other sec-
tions of the Telecomm Act that require the FCC
to conduct a competitive analysis. In holding as it
did, however, the court found that the DOJ could
still use the documents in question if they relate
to the purpose for which they were initially ob-
tained. The DOJ may further use the documents
in its role as an advisor to the FCC. However, the
documents may not be used to investigate wholly
unrelated activity that might be in violation of
other antitrust laws, unless otherwise authorized
by law.
Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online,
Inc.
948 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Penn. 1996)
Issue:
Whether America Online's ("AOL") scheme
which allows its customers to instruct AOL to
block unsolicited electronic mail violates is suffi-
cient evidence to substantiate a temporary re-
straining order under the Sherman Act's essential
facilities doctrine.
Holding:
The temporary restraining order was denied
since there is little likelihood that Cyber Promo-
tions ("Cyber") would be able to establish the nec-
essary elements to a Section 2 monopoly claim,
since, under the essential facilities doctrine, AOL
is not denying Cyber access to the AOL customers
nor has Cyber established that AOL has monopoly
power or, if so, that it was willfully attained.
Discussion:
AOL is a private online company that provides
Internet access and services, including electronic
mail ("e-mail") to its subscribers for a fee. All e-
mail between the Internet and AOL customers
and mail between AOL customers required the
use of AOL's hardware and software, which, while
expandable, has a finite capacity. Cyber provided
e-mail advertising services for third parties by
sending e-mail to a plethora of Internet e-mail ad-
dresses, which included AOL subscribers. Over a
three-month period, AOL's computers processed
over one million unsolicited e-mail messages per
day from Cyber.
Two days after the district court ruled that
Cyber had no First Amendment rights to send un-
solicited e-mail advertisements over the Internet
to AOL subscribers, Cyber alleged that AOL's
blocking scheme (i.e., AOL may block unsolicited
messages to its customers if the customers so
choose) violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act be-
cause AOL was able to obtain a monopoly in the
direct marketing advertising area and sought a
temporary restraining order.
The same district court held that there is little
Discussion:
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likelihood that Cyber will be able to establish the
necessary elements to a Section 2 monopoly claim
since, under the essential facilities doctrine, AOL
is not denying Cyber access to the AOL customers
nor has Cyber established that AOL has monopoly
power in the relevant market. Additionally, the
court held that even if Cyber could show AOL had
monopoly power, it could not show that AOL will-
fully acquired that power. Thus, the court denied
the motion for a temporary restraining order.
However, Cyber was allowed to amend its com-
plaint to include the antitrust claim.
Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corporation
93 F.3d 1055 (2d Cir. 1996)
Issue:
Whether Discon's pleadings alleged the neces-
sary facts and components to substantiate Sections
1 and 2 Sherman Act violations and various Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO") violations.
Holding:
Under Section 1, the pleadings established a
boycott claim since NYNEX failed to state a pro-
competitive rationale for discriminating in favor
of one supplier over another. Under Section 2,
the pleadings fail to support a monopolization or
attempt to monopolization, since NYNEX does
not possess monopoly power in the relevant re-
moval service market. The pleadings established
a conspiracy to monopolize since Discon alleged
that NYNEX agreed to assist in AT&T's attempt to
monopolize the relevant market. Finally, the
three RICO claims were dismissed since Discon
failed to plead the necessary injury or NYNEX en-
joyed an agency relationship with its subsidiaries.
Discussion:
Discon, a telephone removal service, (i.e., re-
mover, salvager, and disposer of obsolete tele-
phone equipment), was formed in response to the
requirement that the Bell Operating Companies
(BOCs) were required to purchase removal ser-
vice from a competitive field of suppliers. Discon
and an AT&T subsidiary both competed in the
New York state area. NYNEX, a BOC successor in
the northeast, wholly owns subsidiary New York
Telephone ("NYTel"), a dominant purchaser of
removal services in the New York area, and Mate-
rial Enterprises ("MECo"), a purchasing agent,
and other related companies. Previously, NYNEX
used a complicated corporate structure to subvert
New York's regulatory scheme, since only NYTel
was subject to state regulation. After a long legal
battle, the FCC forced NYNEX to return over $35
million in overcharges to its customers.
Reversing the district court, which dismissed
Discon's complaint for failure to state a claim, the
Second Circuit found that Discon successfully al-
leged a cause of action under the rule of reason as
applied to boycotts since NYNEX failed to state a
pro-competitive rationale for discriminating in
favor of one supplier over another. The court af-
firmed the district courts decision to dismiss the
monopolization claim since NYNEX did not pos-
sess monopoly power in the relevant removal ser-
vice market. Additionally, for the same reason,
the court dismissed the attempted monopoliza-
tion claim since there was no probability of
NYNEX's success as NYNEX did not have relevant
market power. However, the court sustained Dis-
con's conspiracy to monopolize claim because the
court found specific intent in that NYNEX agreed
to assist in AT&T's attempt to monopolize the rel-
evant market. The court affirmed the district
court's holding to dismiss the three RICO viola-
tions because either Discon failed to plead the
necessary injury or NYNEX enjoyed an agency re-
lationship with its subsidiaries.
U.S. West, Inc., v. Time Warner, Inc.
1996 WL 307445 (Del.Ch. 1996)
Issue:
Whether the exceptions contained in a modifi-
cation agreement amend the particular section of
an original limited partnership agreement so as to
prohibit Time Warner, Inc. (TWI) from acquiring
controlling interest in Turner Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. (TBS).
Holding:
Applying traditional means of contract con-
struction, the modification in question does not
serve to prohibit TWI from acquiring controlling
interest in TBS.
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Discussion: Holding:
This dispute arose out of the creation of a lim-
ited partnership, Time Warner Entertainment
(TWE), which was later modified to allow a new
limited partner, U.S. West, Inc. (U.S. West), to
join. At issue is the acquisition of controlling in-
terest in TBS, a competitor of U.S. West, by an-
other partner in the limited partnership, TWI.
U.S. West brought suit to obtain an injunction
against this acquisition.
Three theories were put forth by U.S. West in
its complaint. The court rejected theories con-
tending that TWI breached its fiduciary duty to
the limited partnership and that TWI was fraudu-
lent in concealing a relevant memorandum. The
court only considered the theory that the 1993
Admission Agreement served to prohibit such an
acquisition. In addressing the claim, the court
had to determine whether TWI or U.S .West had
the better interpretation of the Admission Agree-
ment and disputed Section 5.5. The court con-
cluded that neither interpretation was signifi-
cantly better than the other, but that TWI's
interpretation was more likely to be fair than that
of U.S. West. The court utilized the parole evi-
dence rule to look at the intent of the parties and
concluded that TWI would not be prohibited
from acquiring controlling interest in TBS.
Furthermore, the court claimed that U.S. West
knew or should have known of TWI's intent given
the existence of the initial partnership agree-
ment, that TWI told U.S. West that it intended to
maintain its flexibility regarding TBS, that TWI
told U.S. West if TBS was acquired through TWE
it would first be made available to the partners
and, finally, that U.S. West never negotiated for
such a right in the 1992-1993 negotiations of the
Admission Agreement.
BROADCAST ISSUES
Berger v. CNN, Inc.
24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1757 (Mo. 1996)
Issue:
Whether CNN violated the plaintiffs Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures by filming and broadcasting
the execution of a search warrant on plaintiffs
ranch.
The court granted CNN summary judgment as
the Fourth Amendment claim was collaterally es-
topped because the criminal court upheld the
search.
Discussion:
The Montana Fish and Game Service executed
a valid search warrant pursuant to an investigation
into whether the plaintiff used poisons to kill
predators on his ranch, including eagles. When
federal and state officials entered the plaintiffs
property, they were accompanied by a CNN crew,
which filmed the search warrant execution.
In the criminal case proceeding this civil suit,
the court held that evidence obtained during the
search was admissible and that the filming by the
CNN crew did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment. In this case, the court ruled that the hold-
ing in the criminal court collaterally estops a civil
court from making the same Fourth Amendment
determination. Additionally, the court found that
CNN had not acted under the color of federal law
since their presence during the search furthered
its own interests and therefore could not be found
liable for violating the plaintiffs Fourth Amend-
ment rights.
JB Pictures, Inc. v. U.S. Department of
Defense
86 F.3d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
Issue:
Whether a new Department of Defense policy
on the unloading of caskets during ceremonies
honoring military members' deaths violates the
press' First Amendment right of access.
Holding:
The court upheld the Department of Defense's
new policy under the First Amendment since the
government had interests at stake and the press
still had right to access with consent by the de-
ceased's family.
Discussion:
Prior to the Persion Gulf War, ceremonies hon-
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oring those who died at war were open to the pub-
lic and conducted only at Dover Air Force Base.
The Department of Defense instituted a new pol-
icy which allowed family members a veto power
over press coverage and also moved the ceremo-
nies to the military member's duty or home sta-
tion, rather than Dover.
The court noted that the press has a qualified
right of access under the First Amendment. Fur-
ther, when events are typically open to the public,
the press has a constitutional right to access un-
less "the denial of access is necessitated by an
'overriding' governmental interest and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest." The court found
two reasons for upholding the new policy: (1) re-
duce hardship on the families and friends of the
dead who may feel obliged to attend ceremonies
at Dover and (2) protect the privacy of the fami-
lies and friends in the unloading of caskets.
Moreover, the press may cover the ceremonies if
the family consents. Therefore, the press still en-
joys "'substantial,' though not complete" access to
the unloading of the caskets.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
In re Comcast Cellular
Telecommunications Litigation
949 F.Supp 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
Issue:
Whether the Telecommunications Act of 1996
allows federal courts to take jurisdiction over
claims brought solely under state law.
Holding:
If the true nature of a complaint filed solely in
state court involves causes of action that would
have been available under the Telecomm Act, fed-
eral courts have subject matter jurisdiction and it
is proper for the complaint to be removed to be
federal court.
Discussion:
Customers of Comcast Cellular Telecommuni-
cations brought a class action suit against the
company in state court alleging inadequate disclo-
sure of company billing policies, breach of con-
tract, breach of implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing, and unjust enrichment and restitu-
tion. The court held some of these claims directly
challenged the rates charged for each call and, as
such, state regulation of these practices was pre-
empted by the Telecomm Act. For purposes of
federal preemption, the Telecomm Act governs
when a cause of action arises in direct relation to
a provision of interstate communications service.
In order to be brought in a state court, a cause of
action has to be distinguishable from those cre-
ated under the Telecomm Act. The Savings
clause of the Telecomm Act only serves to pre-
serve independent state law causes of action. In
this case, several of the claims brought by the
plaintiff were indistinguishable from causes of ac-
tion explicitly created by the terms of the
Telecomm Act. The case was rightfully removed
from state court to federal court.
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson
89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996)
Issue:
Whether Ohio has personal jurisdiction where
CompuServe sought a declaration in Ohio that it
had not infringed any common law trademarks of
defendant, a Texan, and that it was not otherwise
guilty of unfair or deceptive trade practices.
Holding:
The defendant had sufficient contacts with
Ohio for Ohio to exercise personal jurisdiction.
Discussion:
The district court held that the electronic links
between the defendant, a Texan, and Ohio,
where CompuServe is headquartered, were too
tenuous to support the exercise of personal juris-
diction. CompuServe appealed the dismissal for
lack of personal jurisdiction of its complaint.
The court considered three factors in deciding
if the defendant had sufficient contacts with Ohio
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would
comport with "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." The first factor, purposeful
availment, is met when the defendant's contacts
with the forum state "proximately result from ac-
tions by the defendant himself that create a 'sub-
stantial connection' with the forum state," and
when the defendant's conduct and connection
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with the forum state are such that he "should rea-
sonably anticipate being haled into court there."
The court determined that the first factor had
been satisfied because the defendant subscribed
to CompuServe, made a Shareware Registration
Agreement, loaded his program onto Com-
puServe's system for others to use, and was thus
on notice that he contracted with an Ohio com-
pany. The absence of physical contacts cannot
overcome personal jurisdiction if a commercial
actor's efforts are 'purposefully directed' toward
residents of another state. The quality of the con-
tacts with Ohio and the defendant's deliberate
and repeated contacts increased the satisfaction
of the factor.
The second factor examines whether the cause
of action arose from the defendant's activities in
Ohio. Because the defendant's contacts with
Ohio were related to the operative facts of the
controversy, the action was determined to have
arisen from those contacts. Finally, the reasona-
bleness factor was satisfied because the first two
factors were met and their satisfaction inferred
the existence of the third factor. The court noted
that its holding was limited to the facts of the case
at bar and should not be applied to other situa-
tions that may arise.
Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.
937 F. Supp. 161 (D.Conn. 1996)
Issue:
Whether the Connecticut long-arm statute,
C.G.S. Section 33-411(c) confers jurisdiction over
the defendant soliciting over the Internet and
whether the statute's jurisdictional reach meets
the "minimum contacts" required to satisfy consti-
tutional due process.
Holding:
The plaintiff established both that solicitation
over the Internet by the defendant within the
meaning of the long-arm statute existed so that
long-arm jurisdiction was proper, and that the
minimum contacts necessary to comply with due
process existed.
Discussion:
The Connecticut long-arm statute, C.G.S. Sec-
tion 33-411 (c) (2) states that "Every foreign cor-
poration shall be subject to suit in this state, by a
resident of this state . . . on any cause of action
arising ... (2) out of any business solicited in this
state . . . if the corporation has repeatedly so solic-
ited business, whether the orders or offers relat-
ing thereto were accepted within or without the
state . . ." The court concluded that the defend-
ant's advertising via the Internet was solicitation
of a sufficiently repetitive nature to satisfy the
Connecticut long-arm statute.
In regard to minimum contacts, the basics of
the test are that there must a purposeful avail-
ment by the defendant of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum state, thus in-
voking the benefits of its laws. Such minimum
contacts must not offend the concept of fair play
and substantial justice. The court determined
that the defendant had satisfied the minimum
contact standard by conducting business in Con-
necticut on a consistent basis. Further, fair play
and substantial justice were met because Massa-
chusetts, defendant's home state, neighbors Con-
necticut. Moreover, Connecticut had an interest
in adjudicating the dispute which involved Con-
necticut common and statutory law.
In addition, venue is proper where a corpora-
tion is subject to personal jurisdiction. Because
defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in
Connecticut, for venue purposes, it was consid-
ered a resident of Connecticut under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391 (b).
COMMON CARRIER ISSUES
BellSouth Corporation v. Federal
Communications Commission
96 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 1996)
Issue:
Whether it is necessary or appropriate for the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to recall its man-
date and vacate structural separation require-
ments for provision of cellular telephone service
by certain telephone operating companies, issued
on November 9, 1995, in Cincinnati Bell Telephone
Company v. FCC, 69 F.3d 752.
Holding:
Motion denied. The court refused to recall its
mandate or to vacate the FCC's cellular structural
separation rule.
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Discussion:
The court concluded that the power to recall a
mandate should be used "sparingly.- The court
noted that fraud upon the court, clerical mistakes
or clarification of an outstanding mandate have
been sufficient grounds for recalling a mandate.
To recall a mandate, the movant must demon-
strate "good cause for that action through a show-
ing of exceptional circumstances" which must be
of a sufficient nature to override the strong public
policy that there be finality in litigation. The
court reviewed whether the 'exceptional circum-
stances' that were cited by the movant were of suf-
ficient nature to allow for recall of the mandate,
but found that the harm to BellSouth, FCC delay
in acting upon the mandate, was insufficient for
the court to exercise its recall power.
Birnbaum v. Sprint Communications
Company
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17389 (E.D. N.Y.
1996)
Issue:
Whether Sprint followed the proper agency
procedures and regulations when it amended its
FCC tariff.
Holding:
Sprint's amended tariff followed the necessary
tariff-filing requirements and as such, the court
granted Sprint's motion for judgment on the
pleadings.
Discussion:
The filed rate doctrine established that rates
once approved are pre se reasonable and unassail-
able. The court asserted that a subscriber must be
conscious of the fact that a particular filed rate is
subject to change and must conform accordingly.
Courts must respect the agency's determination
and therefore cannot grant the relief which plain-
tiff sought as it directly implicates the filed rate
doctrine.
Iowa Utilities Board. v. Federal
Communications Commission
4 Comm. Reg. (P&F) 1360 (8th Cir. 1996)
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to a
stay.
Holding:
The court decided to stay the operation and ef-
fect of the pricing provisions and 'pick and
choose' rules contained in the FCC's First Report
and Order, pending the court's final determina-
tion of the issues raised by the petitioners.
Discussion:
This litigation rises from the FCC's First Report
and Order implementing the local competition
provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
1996. Congress intended for the Act to break the
monopolistic structure that previously existed in
local telephone service markets by permitting
non-incumbent local service providers into the
market. A major part of this 'opening of the mar-
ket' is the Act's requirement that the incumbent
providers privately negotiate in good faith with
other carriers, per Sections 251(c) (1), 252(a).
The FCC promulgated the Total Element Long-
run Incremental Cost (TELRIC) method to calcu-
late the costs that an incumbent LEC incurs in
making its equipment available to its competitors.
As a result, the incumbent LECs brought the pres-
ent action by arguing that the FCC overstepped.its
authority in that TELRIC undercalculates the
costs incurred by the incumbent LECs.
Furthermore, some of the petitioners sought a
stay as to the FCC's "pick and choose" rule, which
requires LECs to make any of its equipment con-
tained in an approved agreement to which an-
other carrier is a party available to any other car-
rier upon the same terms and conditions.
The court used the four-step test denoted in Ar-
kansas Peace Center v. Department of Pollution Control,
992 F.2d 145, 147 (8th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 114
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S.Ct. 1397 (1994), which resulted in the above
holding. These four elements include: (1) the
likelihood that a party seeking the stay will prevail
on the merits of the appeal; (2) the likelihood
that the moving party will be irreparably harmed
absent a stay; (3) the prospect that others will be
harmed if the court grants the stay; and (4) the
public interest in granting the stay.
The court addressed each of these four items
and found, inter alia, that the state commissions,
not the FCC, were authorized by Congress to es-
tablish pricing methods and standards. Further-
more, the court found that TELRIC and the pick
and choose methods would impose substantial
economic harm and losses on many incumbent
LECs, which harm would be 'unrecoverable,' thus
qualifying it as irreparable harm.
COPYRIGHT ISSUES
The Scientist, Inc. v. Lindsey and
Bioresearch
1996 WL 278778 (E.D. Pa 1996)
Issue:
Whether specific features in The Scientist con-
tain the requisite originality to confer copyright
protection so that the defendants' reprinting of
the features provide a basis for a copyright in-
fringement action.
Holding:
The defendants' motion to dismiss the copy-
right count for failure to state a claim failed be-
cause the complaint clearly alleged that the fea-
tures were original. The defendants' motion and
plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment
failed because material issues of fact with regard
to the originality of the features remain.
Discussion:
The plaintiff publishes a biweekly newspaper,
The Scientist, which prints articles and editorials
about science news and research. The Scientist em-
ployed the defendant for approximately two years,
after which the defendant began to publish his
own monthly newsletter, Bioresearch Product News.
The plaintiff alleged that Bioresearch Product
News contained product summaries and photo-
graphs that the defendant took directly from The
Scientist via a scanning mechanism and mechani-
cal retyping. The defendant did not deny copying
the information from The Scientist, but contended
that none of the information contained any origi-
nal thought or expression of the plaintiff and,
therefore, that copying the features cannot sup-
port an action for copyright infringement.
To succeed on a copyright infringement claim,
the court stated that the plaintiff must establish
ownership of a valid copyright and that the de-
fendant copied elements of the copyrighted work
that were original. The defendants in their mo-
tion contended that the plaintiff failed to allege
that materials appearing in Bioresearch Product
News were original. The court concluded that the
plaintiff repeatedly stated in its complaint that the
features at issue involve originality and creativity.
Hence, such statements suffice to defeat defend-
ants' motion to dismiss the copyright count for
failure to state a claim.
In assessing defendants' motion for summary
judgment, the court held that none of the evi-
dence submitted, considered in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, would prevent a reason-
able fact finder from determining that the fea-
tures at issue represent original material. Further-
more, in assessing plaintiffs cross-motion for
summary judgment, the court decided that none
of the evidence submitted, considered in a light
most favorable to the defendants, would hinder a
reasonable fact finder from deciding that the fea-
tures in question involve no originality. Thus, all
motions were denied.
CRYPTOLOGY ISSUES
Bernstein v. U. S. Department of State
945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Ca. 1996)
Issue:
Whether export licensing controls on crypto-
graphic software, under the Arms Export Control
Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR), violate the First Amendment.
Holding:
The court held that (1) licensing requirements
for speech relating to encryption of computer
software constituted unlawful prior restraint; (2)
definitions of terms in ITAR relating to export of
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items are not vague; and (3) exemptions from the
term "technical data" for academic items were im-
permissibly vague.
Discussion:
At the time this action was filed, plaintiff was a
PhD candidate in mathematics at the University of
California, at Berkeley, working in the area of
cryptography. While a graduate student, plaintiff
developed an encryption algorithm.
AECA authorizes the president of the United
States to control the import and export of defense
articles and defense services by designating these
items to the United States Munitions List
(USML). Once on this list, a defense article or
service requires a license as provided for in ITAR
before it can be exported or imported. Crypto-
graphic systems, equipment, modules etc., are
listed on the USML. Technical data is defined
under the ITAR in relation to defense articles, but
it is also defined as a defense article when covered
by the USML. Its definition includes software re-
lating to defense articles, including, inter alia, al-
gorithms and operating systems.
The plaintiff sought to publish his ideas on
cryptography and averred that he is not permitted
to teach his algorithm, discuss it at academic con-
ferences, or publish it without a license. The
plaintiff argued that the licensing scheme under
the ITAR imposes an unconstitutional prior re-
straint upon cryptographic speech, regardless of
whether the speech is defined as a defense article
or technical data. The defendants asserted that
ITAR, in regulating cryptographic software, is
content neutral and survived intermediate scru-
tiny under the First Amendment. Furthermore,
the defendants asserted that the technical data
provisions do not regulate scientific or academic
speech and, hence, do not act as a prior restraint
on the speech.
The court concluded that computer source
code is entitled to First Amendment protection
and that the ITAR scheme, which places no limits
on the discretion of the licenser and no controls
to alleviate the danger of arbitrary or discrimina-
tory licensing decisions, acts as a prior restraint in
violation of the First Amendment. The provision
neither provides a time limit on the licensing de-
cision, nor allows for prompt judicial review.
Moreover, the fact that the USML regulates en-
cryption in the interest of national security does
not alone justify a prior restraint. Further, regula-
tions subjecting technical data to licensing re-
quirements under AECA are unenforceable to the
extent that they encompass items relating to cryp-
tography of computer programs because the pro-
vision imposing licensing requirements upon ex-
port of computer source code relating to
encryption of computer programs is unlawful
prior restraint, in violation of the First Amend-
ment.
The plaintiff further argued that the ITAR's
definition of defense articles, defense services,
and technical data are impermissibly vague. In
determining that these definitions are not vague,
the court instructed the defendants to remove
phrases pertaining to technical data from the defi-
nition of defense article.
The plaintiffs final argument was that the ex-
emptions to the definition of technical data were
vague as they pertain to the exception for aca-
demic items. The court agreed with the plaintiff's
characterization of the exemptions and ruled that
scientists would have difficulty discerning whether
their work was a defense article or was an exemp-
tion under ITAR. As a result, in the field of ap-
plied science, teachings at universities may over-
lap with government regulations. See also,
Bernstein v. U.S. Dept. of State, 922 F.Supp. 1426
(N.D. Ca. 1996).
Karn v. U.S. Department of State
925 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
Issue:
Whether the State Department's designation of
a computer diskette containing cryptographic al-
gorithms as a "defense article" for purposes of the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and Interna-
tional Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which
subjected the disk to export controls, was subject
to judicial review; whether the export limitation
under AECA and ITAR violated the plaintiffs
right to free speech under the First Amendment.
Holding:
The State Department's designation of the dis-
kette as a defense article was subject to judicial re-
view; the export limitation did not violate the
plaintiffs right to free speech.
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Discussion: Holding:
The case arises out of the State Department's
designation of the plaintiffs computer diskette as
a "defense article" pursuant to AECA and ITAR.
The plaintiff alleged that the State Department's
designation of the diskette as a "defense article"
was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA). The defend-
ants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs APA chal-
lenge based on a provision in the AECA
precluding judicial review of the designation of
items as defense articles subject to the AECA.
The court dismissed the plaintiffs APA chal-
lenge to the defendant's designation since Sec-
tion 2778(h) of the AECA bars judicial review of
the president's or the secretary of state's designa-
tion of items as defense articles. The court noted
the legislative history of this provision, which indi-
cated that AECA was enacted to allow the execu-
tive branch to control the export and import of
certain items to further the security and foreign
policy of the United States. The plaintiff further
argued that the defendants' regulation of the dis-
kette constituted a restraint on free speech in vio-
lation of First Amendment rights, since the source
codes on the diskette are comprehensible when
viewed on a personal computer.
The court dismissed the plaintiffs argument
and ruled that the government regulation at issue
is content neutral. The court recognized that the
government regulation was not based on content
of the source codes, but rather based on the belief
that the combination of encryption source code
on machine readable media will facilitate encod-
ing of the communications by foreign intelligence
sources.
FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island
116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996)
Issue:
Whether a Rhode Island statute completely
prohibiting advertisement of liquor prices, except
at the place of sale, violates the First Amendment;
whether a States' power to prohibit commerce in,
or the use of, alcoholic beverages pursuant to the
Twenty-First Amendment qualifies the States' pro-
hibition of liquor advertising.
The Rhode Island statute prohibiting the adver-
tisement of liquor prices abridges speech in viola-
tion of the First Amendment. The Twenty-First
Amendment does not qualify the unconstitutional
ban by the State.
Discussion:
State-imposed restrictions on commercial
speech that is false or misleading are traditionally
analyzed under intermediate scrutiny. However,
when a state entirely prohibits commercial speech
that is neither false nor misleading, there is less
reason to depart from the rigorous review that is
usually demanded under the First Amendment.
Rhode Island's restriction against all liquor
price advertising, except at the place of sale, is a
blanket prohibition against truthful and nonmis-
leading commercial speech about a lawful prod-
uct. The Court found that this blanket prohibi-
tion did not directly advance the States'
purported substantial interest in promoting tem-
perance and, therefore, served an end that was
not related to the protection of customers.
The following two cases involve challenges to
the constitutionality of the Communications De-
cency Act ("CDA"), which was amended to the
Communications Act of 1934 by the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No 104-104, 110
Stat. 56 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223). The
congressional intent of the CDA is to protect mi-
nors from access and exposure to obscene, inde-
cent, sexually explicit, or patently offensive mate-
rial.
American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno
929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D.Pa. 1996).
Issue:
Whether the Communications Decency Act of
1996 ("CDA"), which prohibits the knowing trans-
mission of indecent material to a minor and the
display of and access to sexually explicit material
on the Internet, chills protective indecent speech
and, therefore, violates the First Amendment.
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Holding:
The CDA is unconstitutional on its face because
it is not narrowly-tailored to achieve the goal of
preventing the exposure of indecent material to
children. The CDA is impermissibly vague and vi-
olates both the First and Fifth Amendments, over-
broad in that it chills protective indecent speech,
even if for minimal periods of time. Furthermore,
the affirmative defenses in the CDA are not suffi-
cient to protect speakers from criminal liability
given the limitations in technology.
Discussion:
ACLU, inter alia, challenged two provisions of
the CDA, Sections 223(a) and 223(d), which im-
pose criminal penalties on any person who know-
ingly initiates the transmission of indecent or ob-
scene material to a minor and uses an interactive
computer service to send or display, in any man-
ner, sexually explicit material, respectively. ACLU
asserted that the CDA was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad.
The court reviewed the asserted substantial gov-
ernmental interest in shielding minors from ac-
cess to sexually explicit or indecent materials and
was concerned that the potential harm to chil-
dren was not evident when such materials could
be informative, educational or important subject
matter to older children. The broad prohibition
of such material, irregardless of the context, was a
consideration in the court's vagueness review.
Nonetheless, the court found that there is a com-
pelling governmental interest in protecting mi-
nors from some of the indecent material on the
Internet, but the court found that the CDA is not
narrowly-tailored to meet that objective.
Although the government represented that it
would only enforce violations of the CDA for un-
protected pornographic material, the court found
that this representation was not consistent with
statutory language and did not prevent an ambi-
tious federal prosecutor from vigorous prosecu-
tion at another time. The court held that First
Amendment protection should not be left to the
judgment of prosecutors.
The court also held that the "safe harbor" provi-
sions that provide affirmative defenses upon pros-
ecution were not sufficient because screening
technology was not yet fully developed. Given the
limited availability of technology, most adults will
not be able to avail themselves of the defenses and
to avoid the threat of criminal liability, a speaker
would have to refrain from using any type of sexu-
ally explicit or indecent speech.
The motion for a preliminary injunction was
granted because the ACLU established that the
injunction was in the public interest and the
ACLU was likely to prevail on the merits and
would suffer irreparable harm.
Shea v. Reno
930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Issue:
Whether the Communications Decency Act of
1996 (CDA), which prohibits the display of and
access to indecent or sexually explicit material on
the Internet, chills protective speech and, there-
fore, violates the First Amendment; whether the
two affirmative defenses in the CDA serve to
shield speakers from criminal liability and save
the statute from being overbroad.
Holding:
The CDA is unconstitutional on its face because
it is not narrowly-tailored to achieve the goal of
preventing the exposure of indecent material to
children. Although the CDA is not impermissibly
vague, it is overbroad in that it chills protective
indecent speech, even if for minimal periods of
time. Furthermore, the affirmative defenses in
the CDA are not sufficient to protect speakers
from criminal liability given the limitations in
technology.
Discussion:
Section 223(d) criminalizes the use or display
of any sexually explicit material that is patently of-
fensive by contemporary community standards on
an interactive computer service in a manner that
is available to a person under eighteen years of
age. Content-based regulation of speech is sub-
ject to strict scrutiny, the highest judicial standard
of review. Therefore, to be constitutional, a stat-
ute must be supported by a compelling govern-
mental interest and be narrowly-tailored to
achieve that interest.
Joe Shea, on behalf of the American Reporter,
an electronic newspaper, challenged the constitu-
1997] 333
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
tionality of the CDA on several grounds: (1) the
statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of
the First and Fifth Amendments; (2) the statute is
overbroad as a complete ban on constitutionally
protected adult indecent speech; and (3) the af-
firmative defenses in the statute do not save the
statute from being overbroad.
The court held that Congress' incorporation of
the FCC's indecency standard upheld in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), did not
make the statute unconstitutionally vague. Fur-
thermore, the court disagreed with Shea's claim
that the CDA's requirement that there be an as-
sessment of a work's context is highly unpredict-
able and offensive. There is sufficient case prece-
dent for prosecutors to delineate the contours of
the indecency standard and its application to in-
teractive services. The court also held that the in-
ability of an Internet content provider to assess
what community standards would govern trans-
mission was not a novel problem, but one in
which the burden is on the content provider to be
informed about the standards of the various com-
munities in which its material is to be distributed.
The Shea court distinguished its holding from
the Third Circuit's holding that the CDA was un-
constitutionally vague because the CDA left open
the possibility for arbitrary enforcement. See Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824
(E.D.Pa.1996). There were no such representa-
tions by the government in this case, therefore en-
forcement was not an issue.
However, the court did find that the statute was
overbroad because adult speakers do not have a
way of transmitting content with certainty that it
would not reach minors. Therefore, the CDA is
not narrowly-tailored. Fear of criminal prosecu-
tion would necessitate that an adult speaker re-
frain totally from using constitutionally protected
speech.
The court held that the government did not
meet its burden in proving that the statutory de-
fenses preserved an adult Internet speaker's abil-
ity to engage in constitutionally protected inde-
cent speech. The court recognized that the use of
adult verification services would be an undue bur-
den and costly to content providers and that ac-
cess to new screening technology was not depen-
dent on the actions of third parties who were not
obligated or statutorily mandated to provide such
technology. Given the limited availability of
screening technology, most adults will not be able
to avail themselves of the defenses. To avoid the
threat of criminal liability, a speaker would have
to refrain from using any type of patently offen-
sive speech.
The court also declined to limit the statute's
scope because any limitation to the category of
content provider would not be consistent with the
congressional intent to apply the CDA's prescrip-
tions to both commercial and non-commercial
providers. The motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion was granted because the Plaintiff established
that he was likely to prevail on the merits and
would suffer irreparable harm.
United States v. Thomas
74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996)
Issue:
Whether defendants' operation of an Amateur
Action Computer Bulletin Board System
(AABBS), an electronic bulletin board system that
operated by using telephones, modems and per-
sonal computers to enable members to access por-
nographic materials on the bulletin board, consti-
tuted a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462 and 1465,
federal obscenity laws.
Holding:
The convictions and sentences of the defend-
ants were upheld by the Court, which found the
operation of the bulletin board to be in violation
of the federal obscenity laws.
Discussion:
A Tennessee jury convicted the defendants
under Sections 1462 and 1465 for distributing ob-
scene material via their electronic bulletin board
system (BBS), which was run by the defendants
from California. The defendants approved a Ten-
nessee resident to become a member of their BBS
and transmitted material deemed obscene under
the community standards in Tennessee. The de-
fendants challenged their convictions on grounds
including the First Amendment, venue and fed-
eral statututory law.
The defendants challenged the community
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standard to be applied by the jury in determining
whether material is obscene under the second of
the three-prong test for obscenity established in
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The de-
fendants objected to the application of the com-
munity standard of the receiving community. Re-
jecting the defendants' argument, the court
noted that the standards applied in the trial are
those of the district in which the trial takes place
and that offenses are properly prosecuted in
either the district of dispatch or receipt. The de-
fendants asserted that without a more flexible def-
inition of community, a chill on protected speech
will result because BBS operators will not be able
to select those who receive the material and will
be forced to censor their material in order to
comply with diverse community standards. The
court declined to reach the question of the neces-
sity to establish a new definition of community be-
cause the defendants had in place a method to
limit user access in jurisdictions where the com-
munity standards would create a greater risk of
finding the material obscene. The court noted
that if the defendants wished to avoid liability in
jurisdictions with different standards, they could
have denied membership to persons in those ju-
risdictions.
The defendants next argued that the district
court erred in its instruction to the jury that the
prosecution was not required to present expert
testimony on the prurient appeal of the materials,
required in the second prong of the Miller test.
The defendants argued that the government is re-
quired to present expert testimony when sexually-
explicit material is directed at a deviant group.
The court found that the instruction was not erro-
neous. First, the court noted that the Supreme
Court has held repeatedly that expert testimony is
not necessary to assist a jury in determining the
obscenity of material which has been placed into
evidence. The traditional use of expert testimony,
to assist lay jurors in understanding what they
would be unable to understand without the testi-
mony, was not present. Second, the court noted
that the Supreme Court has reserved judgment
on whether expert testimony is required where
the material is directed at a bizarre deviant group,
which would render the experience of the jurors
inadequate to judge whether the material appeals
to prurient interest. Thus, as there is not a per se
rule adopted by the Supreme Court or in the ju-
risdiction to the contrary, the court found the in-
struction to be proper.
Further, the court rejected Defendants' chal-
lenge to venue in the Western District of Tennes-
see for the counts of the indictment relating to
the files which were transmitted to Tennessee.
Defendants asserted that they did not cause the
files to be transmitted to Tennessee, but that the
government agent caused the transmission. To
establish a violation of § 1465, the prosecution
must prove that a defendant knowingly used a fa-
cility or means of interstate commerce for the
purpose of distributing obscene materials. The
court noted that § 1465 does not require the pros-
ecution to prove that the defendant had specific
knowledge of the destination of each transmittal
at the time it occurred. Finding venue to be
proper, the court noted that the AABBS was set
up to provide access to and instant transmission
through interstate commerce of files to members
in other jurisdictions. The defendants approved
AABBS members and distributed materials fully
aware of members' home states.
Lastly, the court disagreed with the defendants'
contention that § 1465 did not apply because the
transmission of the files involved an intangible
string of O's and 1's which became viewable
images only after they were decoded by an AABBS
member's computer. The court reasoned that the
defendants focused on the means of transporta-
tion rather than the fact that the transmissions be-
gan with computer generated images in Califor-
nia and ended with the same computer-generated
images in Tennessee. The court noted that the
manner in which the images were transmitted
does not affect the ability to see the images on the
screen or to print the images.
SATELLITE ISSUES
Advanced Communications Corporation
v. FCC
84 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
Issue:
Whether the FCC decision denying Advanced
Communications Corporation's ("ACC") request
for a second four-year extension during which it
could begin operating its direct broadcast satellite
system was arbitrary and capricious.
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TRADEMARK ISSUES
The FCC decision denying ACC's request for an
extension was not arbitrary and capricious.
Discussion:
The FCC awarded ACC a conditional construc-
tion permit to provide direct broadcast satellite
("DBS") service. Under FCC rules, ACC had to
satisfy two due diligence requirements: First, it
must "begin construction or complete contracting
for construction of [its satellite system] within one
year of the grant of the construction permit", and
second, it must begin operating its system "within
six years of the construction permit grant." ACC
fulfilled the first requirement, and requested a
second four-year extension to satisfy the second
requirement. The FCC denied the request, find-
ing that it would not serve the public interest, and
declared the ACC's permit null and void.
ACC appealed based on three grounds. First,
ACC argued that the FCC's decision was an arbi-
trary departure from agency precedent. The
court found that although the Order departed
from precedent, the fact that this was the first
time the FCC denied an extension to a DBS per-
mittee does not mean the FCC acted in a manner
inconsistent with its precedent. The FCC articu-
lated sufficient distinctions from the other cases
where they had granted the extensions.
Second, ACC argued that the FCC failed to pro-
vide a reasonable explanation for its decision and
the subsequent delay in the initiation of new DBS
service. The court stated that while timely initia-
tion of DBS service is one of the FCC's goals, it
has never been the sole criterion in determining
whether to grant an extension. Rather, the FCC
considers the totality of the circumstances - those
efforts made and not made by the permittee to
comply with the due diligence requirements.
Third, ACC argued that in making its decision,
the FCC improperly considered the revenues to
be gained from the auction of ACC's orbital slot
and channels. The court responded by saying
that although the FCC was aware of the expected
Federal revenue, it's Order does not base its de-
nial on this expectation, but rather on ACC's fail-
ure to achieve any concrete progress towards satis-
fying the second due diligence requirement.
Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc.
86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996)
Issue:
Whether the owner of a 1-800 vanity telephone
number, 1-800-HOLIDAY, has trademark rights,
under the Lanham Act, in a neighboring 1-800
number, 1-800-H"O"LIDAY, which its customers
frequently misdial by accident and are then of-
fered a competing service.
Holding:
The plain language of the Lanham Act does not
support a finding of trademark infringement
since the defendant did not use the Holiday Inn
mark or a confusing likeness.
Discussion:
800 Reservation, a hotel reservation service
company, secured the rights to a 1-800 number
that was the frequently mis-dialed Holiday Inns'
reservation number. Holiday Inns' vanity number
was 1-800-HOLIDAY, while 800 Reservation's
number was 1-800-H ("0") LIDAY. 800 Reservation
discovered that Holiday Inns' customers fre-
quently substituted "zero" for the "0" and began
offering hotel reservation service to those Holiday
Inns' customers who misdialed. Holiday Inns
filed a Lanham Act suit alleging unfair competi-
tion and trademark infringement. The district
court held that even though 800 Reservation did
not violate the "letter" of the Lanham Act, it nev-
ertheless violated the "spirit" of the Act, and
therefore permanently enjoined the use by 800
Reservation from using the frequently mis-dialed
1-800 number. The Sixth Circuit reversed.
A prerequisite to a Lanham Act violation is the
unauthorized use of a protected mark or the use
of a misleading representation of the protected
mark. However, the Sixth Circuit held that
although Holiday Inns own trademark rights in 1-
800-Holiday, it cannot claim such a right in the 1-
800-H"O"LIDAY number. Thus, since 800 Reser-
vation neither used the Holiday Inn mark or a
confusing likeness, there can be no infringement.
The court further determined that "stretching the
Holding:
336 [Vol. 5
MAJOR COURT DECISIONS OF 1996
plain language of the Lanham Act to cover the
present dispute is unjustified."
Malarkey-Taylor Association, Inc. v.
Cellular Telcommunications Industry
Association
929 F. Supp. 473 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
Issue:
Whether the Malarkey-Taylor Association
(MTA), owner of the "WirelessNOW' mark,
should be granted a preliminary injunction based
upon trademark infringement and unfair compe-
tition for Cellular Telecommunication Industry
Association (CTIA) use of its "Go Wireless Now!"
mark.
Holding:
MTA's application for a preliminary injunction
was granted and CTIA was enjoined from using
"Go Wireless NOW!"
Discussion:
The court based its grant of preliminary injunc-
tion in part, on the unusual and distinctive nature
of MTA's mark. The court also applied the Polar-
oid Factors in order to determine whether there
was a likelihood of confusion by the use of CTIA's
mark. The use of the same words and the poten-
tial for MTA to "bridge the gap" by offering the
same services were relevant factors considered by
the court. The existence of actual confusion,
although not determinative, was given some
weight in the court's analysis. Lastly, the fact that
CTIA did not apply for a trademark registration
until it was placed on notice by MTA, influenced
the court to grant the preliminary injunction.
Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold
947 F. Supp. 1338 (1996)
Issue:
Whether Goldmail mark owner, Maritz, Inc., is
entitled to a preliminary injunction against de-
fendant's Internet use of the Cybergold mark
under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a).
Holding:
Maritz, Inc. is not entitled to a preliminary in-
junction because it failed to meet the criteria for
an injunction.
Discussion:
To grant a preliminary injunction, the court
needed to evaluate four considerations. The first
consideration, balance of hardships, required the
court to balance between the harm to the party
seeking an injunction and the injury that granting
such injunction would inflict on the other inter-
ested parties. The plaintiff argued that the harm
to defendant would be minimal because the de-
fendant's service was not yet operational and had
not begun to enroll subscribers. Yet, the defend-
ant would incur injury, according to the court, be-
cause Cybergold had expended considerable ef-
fort and money in soliciting companies and
businesses to advertise on its service. In doing bal-
ance of hardship evaluations, the court could only
consider the harm that would be caused by de-
fendant's conduct that would constitute a viola-
tion of the Lanham Act. Thus, the likelihood of
confusion that existed due to the similarity of the
two markets had to be considered and that re-
quired an evaluation of the second consideration,
probability of success on the merits.
To show probability of success on the merits,
the second consideration, plaintiff had to prove
that the defendant's use of a name created a like-
lihood of confusion, deception, or mistake among
an appreciable number of ordinary buyers as to
the source of or association between the two
names. In its analysis, the court first classified the
Goldmail mark as suggestive and hence eligible
for trademark protection without requiring any
proof of secondary meaning. Next, in consider-
ing the similarity between the two marks, the
court determined the two marks similar in their
suggestive meaning but otherwise there was lim-
ited similarity. Third, the court determined that
because both plaintiff and defendant would be in
direct competition, there was a close competitive
proximity which increased the opportunity for
confusion by consumers. Fourth, there was no ev-
idence of defendant's intent to create confusion
between the two products. Fifth, plaintiff did not
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provide any admissible evidence of actual confu-
sion and it was unlikely any could assist because
both plaintiff and defendant were new to the pub-
lic. Lastly, in considering the degree of care rea-
sonably expected of plaintiffs potential ordinary
customers, the court said that these customers
could or would subscribe to the two Internet serv-
ices free of any cost to them and thus the degree
of care would be minimal and the possibility of
potential confusion high as a result. Considering
these six elements, the court decided that plaintiff
had not shown that defendant's use of the
Cybergold mark had created a likelihood of con-
fusion, deception, or mistake among an apprecia-
ble number of ordinary buyers as to the source or
association of the Internet services of the two par-
ties.
Regarding the third consideration in deciding
upon a preliminary injunction, threat of irrepara-
ble harm, the court said that it could presume
that irreparable injury would occur absent an in-
junction if the court found a probable success in
proving likelihood of confusion. In this case, the
plaintiff did not show a probability of success on
the merits as needed for factor two and, as a re-
sult, irreparable harm was not shown either.
The fourth consideration, whether the public
interest would be furthered by granting plaintiff a
preliminary injunction in a Lanham Act case, re-
quired the court evaluate the consumer's right
not to be confused as to the origin of goods and
the public's interest in the ability to obtain the
lowest priced goods. The court decided that the
public interest would be furthered by competition
between plaintiff and defendant and that the like-
lihood of confusion among ordinary consumers
was minimal. Thus, the plaintiffs motion for a
preliminary injunction was denied.
WIRELESS ISSUES
BellSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Gwinnett
County, Georgia
944 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Ga. 1996)
Issue:
Whether a local government can preempt a
specific provision under the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 by denying an application for a per-
sonal wireless service facility without supporting
its decision in writing and with substantial evi-
dence contained in a written record.
Holding:
A local government cannot deny an application
for a personal wireless service facility unless its de-
cision is in writing and supported by substantial
evidence.
Discussion:
The local board of commissioners for Gwinnett
County voted to deny BellSouth's application for
a tall structure permit without any type of written
explanation. The Telecommunications Act of
1996 states that any decision by a State or local
government to deny a request to place a personal
wireless facility "shall be in writing and supported
by substantial evidence contained in a written rec-
ord." "Substantial evidence" is more than a mere
scintilla, and means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to sup-
port a conclusion.
The court also held that the Telecomm Act
vests the court with sufficient authority to grant
mandamus relief if the circumstances warrant it.
Thus, the court decided that it did not have to
remand the case back to the local government,
but could itself decide whether the plaintiffs com-
plied with all of the objective conditions and pre-
requisites set out in Gwinnett County's code.
Cellular One v. Council of Township of
Hampton
686 A.2d 905 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1996)
Issue:
Whether Cellular One is a public utility under
the town law and, if so, whether it met the pri-
mary criteria for a conditional use permit to en-
able Cellular One to construct equipment for pro-
viding cellular telephone service.
Holding:
The town could not deny Cellular One a condi-
tional use permit because the cellular provider
met the town's definition of a public utility and
fulfilled the primary criteria for conditional use.
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Discussion:
Cellular One, a cellular telephone service pro-
vider, applied to the Township of Hampton for
conditional use approval to construct a 150-foot
steel telephone pole and equipment shelter on
property owned by Cellular One. An ordinance
of Hampton permitted such equipment as the
pole and shelter as conditional use by the zoning
arrangement provided for that district if Cellular
One could be deemed a public utility. Hampton's
code defined a public utility as a "service distribut-
ing water, gas, electricity, etc., or collecting sew-
age by means of a network of overhead or under-
ground lines and requiring at various locations to
maintain efficiency of the system pumping, regu-
lating, transformer, switching, and other devices."
Hampton argued that Cellular One was not a pub-
lic utility because there is no network of overhead
or underground lines with cellular phone service.
The court held that although the ordinance does
not specifically include a cellular telephone com-
pany, the use of the word "etc." reveals the draft-
ers' intent to include uses not specifically enumer-
ated. The court further stated- that Cellular One
does in fact utilize overhead or underground
lines.
Pennsylvania law defined conditional use as a
use "which the governing authority has deter-
mined is not adverse in and of itself to the public
interest." Hampton argued that Cellular One
does not meet this requirement because it endan-
gers public health and safety and is not in general
conformity and harmony with the area. The court
held that there is no substantial evidence as to the
effects of exposure to radio-frequency "radiation."
It goes on to state that the Township raises health
concerns despite the fact that it currently leased
property to Cellular One's competitor, Bell Atlan-
tic Mobile Systems. The court also held that aes-
thetics alone has never served as a reason to deny
a property owner the legal use of his land.
Cellular One v. Walworth County
556 N.W. 2d 107 (Wis.App. 1996)
Issue:
Whether, under the Telecomm Act, the county
acted in a discriminatory manner in denying Cel-
lular One's application for a conditional use per-
mit to construct a telecommunications tower.
Holding:
The court remanded Cellular One's application
to the county board for consideration in a nondis-
criminatory manner of evidence that Cellular
One is similarly situated to previously approved
applicants.
Discussion:
Cellular One applied for a conditional use per-
mit to construct a 200-foot telecommunications
tower in Walworth County. Local residents op-
posed the tower, arguing that the tower's electro-
magnetic emissions might create health hazards,
the tower depreciated the value of the surround-
ing property, and the tower caused negative aes-
thetics to the surrounding scenic farmland. The
county denied Cellular One's application based
on the reasoning that the tower would reduce the
value of the neighbor's property.
Cellular One sought certiorari review of the
county's decision in circuit court, requesting that
the court enlarge the record and consider evi-
dence that the county had previously approved
similarly situated towers to prove that the county
had acted in a discriminatory manner. The cir-
cuit court refused to supplement the record, rul-
ing that it did not have such authority and that
the record was sufficient to support a decision to
deny the application.
A provision of the Telecomm Act prohibits au-
thorities from using the zoning process to unrea-
sonably discriminate against competing service
providers. The court stated that the fact that the
county had previously approved similarly situated
towers is material to the open competition issues
that are emphasized in the Telecomm Act. It rea-
soned that Cellular One's concerns about nondis-
criminatory placement of the towers might bal-
ance against the county's concerns about
declining property values. The court remanded
the case and directed the county to examine the
record de novo such that Cellular One could in-
troduce its evidence regarding other tower ap-
provals.
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Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina
924 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Wash. 1996)
Issue:
Whether a city's placement of a six-month mor-
atorium on the issuance of new permits for wire-
less communications facilities violates § 704 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Holding:
A six-month moratorium on the issuance of
new permits for wireless communications facilities
does not, without more, violate § 704 of the
Telecomm Act.
Discussion:
Sprint Spectrum, which sought to provide wire-
less personal communications services in the city
of Medina, Washington, challenged a city's six-
month moratorium on the issuance of new per-
mits for the placement of antennas and other
wireless communications facilities. The morato-
rium did not affect the processing of applications.
The court rejected three arguments put forth by
Sprint Spectrum that the city's action violated sec-
tion 704 of the Telecommunications Act and re-
jected its motion for a preliminary injunction.
First, the court concluded that the city did not
violate § 704(a) (7) (B) (i) (II), which provides that
local governments may not pass regulations which
have the effect of prohibiting for the provision of
wireless communications services. The court rea-
soned that because the moratorium did not affect
the processing of permits, but only resulted in
short-term suspensions, it did not violate the Tele-
communications Act. Second, the city did not vio-
late § 704(a) (7) (B) (ii), which requires local gov-
ernments to act on permit applications within a
reasonable period of time. Because the city en-
acted the measure for the purpose of determining
whether such towers were needed and whether
they affected the health of residents, the city acted
consistent with the reasonableness requirement of
the Telecomm Act. Finally, the court concluded
that the ordinance did not "unreasonably discrim-
inate among providers" of similar services for the
purposes of § 704(a) (7) (B) (i) (II). The court
found that the moratorium was not discrimina-
tory because it applied to all service providers.
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